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ABSTRACT
Can value allocation be left to managerial discretion and does corpo-
rate law provide the basis for a balanced stakeholder management 
and a fair allocation of results? This question is central in an age of 
inequality. We argue that it can be reappraised by building upon the 
case of maritime law. Whereas in corporate law, the board is in charge 
of allocating the results, maritime law stipulates a clear ex ante rule 
according to which it allows a captain to sacrifice some goods to save 
the ship. This historical ‘rule of general averages’ emerged in 
Antiquity. It compels the interested parties to jointly bear costs. 
This rule makes visible what we call a ‘partnering effect’ of managerial 
authority and suggests that corporate law, as it currently stands, lacks 
a conceptualization of the impacts of managerial discretion and 
therefore limits the possibility of a fair allocation of results. While 
management scholars have sought to rethink management theory 
with a ‘view from law’, we conclude that law could also be discussed 
with a view from management history.
KEYWORDS 
Stakeholder theory; 
managerial discretion; value 
allocation; corporate law; 
managerial authority; 
partnering effect; fairness
Today, corporate behavior is implicated in a growth in inequality (Bivens and Mischel 
2015). A recent report noted that, in France, for example, the distribution of wealth among 
the stakeholders of the biggest listed companies has never been so unequal: from 2009 to 
2016, the 40 biggest companies redistributed 67.4% of their profits to shareholders in the 
form of dividends as opposed to only 5.3% to employees (Aubry, Alliot, and Sylvain 2018). 
Income inequality can have significant effects on organizations (Ni, Qian, and Crilly 2014; 
Bapuji and Neville 2015), and managerial decisions are recognized as a key factor in 
income inequality (Cobb 2016) which has reached its highest level ever in the United 
States (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez 2011). This situation revives the question of whether 
value allocation should be normatively ruled by law or left to corporate freedom and 
managerial discretion.
This is a challenging question for stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theorists emphasize 
that stakeholders should not be considered in terms of their respective power, but based 
on the principle of fairness (Buren Van 2001, Phillips 2003). However, they usually refrain 
from setting clear rules on how to allocate the value created by joint investments in the 
corporate ventures among the different stakeholders. They argue instead that value 
allocation is a managerial tool (Scott et al. 2014): managers use value sharing as 
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a means of reducing supervision costs, limiting free riding, increasing parties’ motivation 
(Kruse 1996), and retaining their willful participation to foster value creation (Harrison, 
Bosse, and Phillips 2010). Stakeholder theorists generally consider that it is in the interest 
of the company to allocate rewards in a neutral and fair way as this determines the 
possibility of investments from the different constituencies in the company. In this view, 
the role of corporate law is not to rule on value allocation, but to protect the board, for 
instance by insulating directors from stakeholder pressure (Blair and Stout 1999; Lan and 
Heracleous 2010).
Yet, given the increasing level of inequality, a fundamental research question arises: 
Does corporate law provide the basis for fairness in business? Or could corporate law 
integrate a more explicit solidarity rule? In this article, we investigate these questions by 
examining the historical case of maritime law. This historical rule is interesting because, 
while corporate law leaves value allocation to the discretion of companies’ leaders, 
maritime law adopts the opposite norm: it specifies a clear ex ante rule on value sharing. 
Maritime law vests the captains with great latitude and authority: captains are legally 
allowed to jettison the goods they are carrying if that will save their vessel from being 
shipwrecked. Yet, contrary to corporate law, maritime law does not let the captain (or 
anyone else) decide how the loss is to be shared: it stipulates that the effects of decisions 
made for the common good should be jointly supported. This rule is called the rule of 
‘general averages,’ as it deals with damages that are general, i.e. decided by the captain 
and for the collective interest, as opposed to damages that merchants bear privately.
We argue that the historical rule of general averages can enrich the way we theorize 
fairness in business corporations in important ways. There are clear similarities between 
the case of the ship and the case of the business corporation: in both cases, there are 
strong interdependencies between the stakeholders, whose welfare depends on the 
survival of the ship or the business entity. In both cases, an authority, with important 
discretion, is entitled to take decisions for the sake of the joint welfare: the captain is 
responsible for the expedition and his role is to do his best to safeguard the ship and what 
it conveys. The business leader has also fiduciary duties to run the company for its best 
interest and long-term success. And for the sake of the common endeavor, both the 
captain and the business leader have the discretion to make decision that can impact 
stakeholders’ individual wealth. The human capital of employees may also be impacted, 
either positively or negatively, by managerial decisions. And the latter can also affect 
shareholder values, as well as other stakeholders’ wealth.
While the rule of general averages focuses on the extreme decision of sacrifices, it can 
shed light on some class of decisions where the managerial decisions impact stakeholders 
for the common welfare. Typically, when employees are made redundant for economic 
reasons, their layoffs are meant to enable the firm to survive. Of course, the captain’s 
situation is very different from that of a business manager. But in this article, we would like 
to show that the analogy can open up the way solidarity is conceptualized in business and 
suggest new norms for value allocation.
More specifically, the maritime rule leads us to conceptualize what we call the ‘partner-
ing effect’ of managerial discretion. And this has three main implications. First, our 
analysis of the rule of general averages illustrates that the impacts of managerial decisions 
on individual stakeholders could be approached as ‘general averages’ instead of personal 
returns. Second, for stakeholder theory, it suggests that a distinction must be made 
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between those stakeholders who accept managerial authority and others. As the ship 
captain’s decision binds the parties on whose behalf the decision is made, we argue that, 
in companies, those stakeholders who accept managerial authority (and only them) may 
be bound together by the partnering effect. Third, our analysis has also normative 
implications. To date, corporate law has provided directors with the leeway to allocate 
value. But we suggest that a new view of managerial discretion and its general effects 
could lead to a more explicit solidarity rule.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The first section develops the historical 
case of maritime law. In order to use the case as the source of our analogy, we map the 
structural interdependencies of the rule by modeling the ‘partnering effect’ of the 
captain’s decision. The second section develops the analogy between the ship captain 
and the corporate leaders, and clarifies both the similarities and dissimilarities of the two 
domains of maritime and corporate laws. The stakeholder theory views managerial 
discretion as a central condition both for efficient and fair management. But there are 
still many debates on the conditions and possibility of fairness in corporations and that is 
why the analogy with the maritime law can be inspiring. The third section discusses the 
lessons that can be derived from the analogy. Our study finally opens up new ways to 
manage value allocation in companies and suggests an agenda for future research on 
how corporate law could integrate an explicit solidarity rule. It also invites management 
scholars to reflect on management and management history to rethink corporate law in 
terms of stakeholder orientation.
Three preliminary remarks are necessary to specify the scope of our research. First, by 
value allocation, we mean not only the distribution of net corporate income, but also the 
impacts of management decisions on stakeholders. A company can either issue or buy 
back shares, and can either provide secure jobs or impose layoffs. Following stakeholder 
theory, we are thus concerned with all of the potential impacts of management decisions 
on stakeholders. Second, we do not deal with the general question of fairness or equity in 
companies, nor do we discuss the various means managers use to allocate value. Instead, 
we examine how the impacts of managerial discretion need to be apprehended and 
whether value allocation should be left to managerial discretion or determined by 
a normative rule. Therefore, our literature review focuses on stakeholder theory, manage-
rial discretion, and value allocation in corporate law. Third, and for the same reasons, we 
do not make any distinction among corporate leaders. Although there are clear and 
important distinctions between directors, non-executive directors, and executive officers, 
we do not distinguish between them because we focus specifically on the corporate 
freedom to allocate value. Consequently, we refer to ‘management’ as ‘the team of 
directors and officers who shape board decisions’ (Bebchuk, 2005: 842).
1. The case of maritime law: the rule of general averages
To examine how the recognition of an authority affects the principles of fairness, we use 
the specific example of maritime law. We are particularly interested in one of the rules of 
maritime law, the so-called ‘rule of general averages,’ as it concerns the way in which the 
consequences of the captain’s decisions are shared among the various parties involved. 
This rule explicitly connects the discretionary power of the captain with a specific rule 
regarding value allocation. The captain’s decisions that are taken for the ‘common good’ 
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imply rules that contrast with those of corporate law in that they do not leave the 
allocation of the value to the discretion of the captain.
As we will demonstrate, the historical case is also relevant because it provides 
a theoretical model of the ‘partnering effect’ that explains why the rule of general 
averages is both efficient and fair in relation to the various stakeholders.
1.1 The rule of general averages: historical background
The exact origin of the rule of general averages is unknown, but traces have been found in 
ancient laws, and it seems to have been applied by most seagoing nations. The rule is 
apparently an example of lex maritima, dating back to the unwritten Rhodian Law of 
c. 800–900, but actual evidence has only been found from Roman Law onwards.1 In the 
late 18th century, the rule was incorporated into the common law of the UK. And in 1801, 
the definition was clarified in a famous case Birkley v Presgrave:
“all losses which arise in consequence of extraordinary made or expenses incurred for the 
preservation of the ship and cargo comes within the general average and must be borne 
proportionately by all who are interested” (Jervis 2013, 130)
.
The Glasgow conference in 1860 invited the different maritime societies in all the different 
European and the USA to discuss the uniformization of the rule and to draw up a code. 
After important conferences in York (1864) and Antwerp (1877), a code was published 
with a series of 11 rules dealing with some controversial matters in a conference in 
Liverpool in 1890.
The York-Antwerp Rules have been revised several times and complemented with 
different rules of interpretation. But several authors have shown that the rule, which 
concerns ‘general’ damages, has been in permanent use from Lex Rhodia de Jactu 
(Rhodian Law of Jettison) to the York-Antwerp Rules of 1994, which are still incorporated 
into international contracts of carriage today (Frignet 1859; Szramkiewicz 1989; Hatchuel 
1997; BIMCO 2002; Tetley 2003; Dusserre 2004).
Under maritime law, the owners of goods are responsible for covering certain main-
tenance and repair costs, but all those concerned with a maritime shipment must share 
the costs arising from the damages that are referred to as gross or ‘general averages.’ 
General averages correspond to expenditure, investments, or sacrifices made intention-
ally by the captain in the face of peril at sea or events that endanger the shipment. The 
York Antwerp Rules state that:
“There is a general average act when, and only when, any extraordinary sacrifice or 
expenditure is intentionally and reasonably made or incurred for the common safety for 
the purpose of preserving from peril the property involved in a common maritime adventure” 
(Rule 2004).
The rules are as follows:
-The captain can make expenditures or sacrifices if they are needed and if they are 
made in the reasonable interests of ensuring ‘the common safety.’ In this event, the costs 
are shared in the common interest of the ship and its cargo.
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-A principle of fairness is then applied, obliging all of the people involved in the 
shipment to share the costs incurred by the captain or the damages suffered by the 
owner of the sacrificed goods. The owners of the ship and the cargo must share the 
sacrifice collectively. The contribution of each party is calculated pro rata based on the 
value of their property at the end of the voyage.
The rule and its implementation have raised, of course, a large number of questions, for 
instance, how to mark out those losses covered by general averages? To clarify the rules, 
different notions have been introduced, such as the notion of ‘direct losses’: as only direct 
losses are accepted as general averages, loss or damages, such as loss of market, sustained 
by the ship or cargo through delay cannot be admitted as general average. In the case of 
the Leitrim (1902) reported by Jervis (2013, 135), ‘the shipowner claimed in general 
average for the loss of time hire that he had sustained owing to the vessel being off 
hire while undergoing general average repairs’.
The judge disallowed the claim:
“It may be said why on principle should the loss of time not be compensated for where that loss is 
due to the necessity of repairing damage, itself the subject of general average? I think the answer 
is that, although there possibly may be cases like the present, the loss of time is common to all the 
parties interested and all suffer damage by the delay, so that the damage by loss of time may be 
considered proportionate to the interests and may be left out of consideration.”
Another question was the methods for dispatching the costs to share among the under-
writers: how to assess the values of the cargo and the ship? And how to adjust them? It 
has become the role of specialized professionals, the average adjusters. But ‘average 
adjustment is a notoriously complicated and time-consuming process’. In 1991, this issue 
was considered so problematic that a report was commissioned by the Trade and 
Development Board of the United Nations (UNCTAD 1991).
1.2 General averages: principle of equity
The United Nations report examined the possibility of simplifying general average pro-
cedure, but it also investigated ‘whether it would be an advantage to abolish the GA 
altogether and let the loss lie where it falls so that the particular underwriter of the interest 
concerned bears the burden’ (UNCTAD 1991, 1). Interestingly, the report concluded that 
those ultimately most concerned recognized the value of leaving the equitable principles 
of general average undisturbed (UNCTAD 1991, 48).
The main argument in favor of the general averages was clearly equity. The report 
recalled the conclusion of the former IUMI committee in 1948 which ‘clearly considered 
that equity and the historical basis of the institution of GE were the strongest reasons in 
favour of its retention’. The report referred to equity as being the ‘fundamental principle 
which GE contains’. And it quotes Selmer (1958, 121):
“the justice and equity of this idea strikes one immediately. In fact, it is hardly possible to attack 
general average on point of principle. The distribution appeals so much to the intuitive sense of 
justice, that everybody must agree that a more fair system cannot be invented.”.
The notion of equity is indeed central in the distribution system underlying the concept of 
general averages. It was already clear in the Digest, as shown by the Roman jurist Paulus’ 
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quote: “it is perfectly just [authors underlining] that the loss should be partially borne by those 
who, by the destruction of the property of others, have secured the preservation of their own 
merchandise’ (Digest 14.2.2). As Jervies summarizes: The General averages are ‘founded on the 
principle of equity – in other words, everyone involved in the adventure is in the same boat (both 
literally and metaphorically) and a sacrifice by one party for the benefit of all should be borne by 
all (including the one who made the sacrifice or expenditure)’ (Jervis 2013, 130).
1.3 The partnering effect of the captain’s discretion
At first sight, the rules seem relatively close to the partnership or corporate framework: 
the partners or the shareowners embark on a shared enterprise and in the event of losses, 
these are shared among the participants. However, the rules are quite original. Here, we 
identify three specificities that will be important in our analogy.
1.3.1. Captains’ discretion for the common good
Throughout the voyage, the merchants still own their goods, but they no longer manage 
them. The captain is entrusted by the different parties (the merchants and the ship owner) 
to make decision on their goods when necessary. The parties do not transfer their 
property rights, but transfer control of their goods to the captain, whose mission is to 
ensure that the goods arrive safe and sound.
The discretion given to the captain is efficient because it ensures unbiased decisions. 
Thanks to this latitude, the captain can minimize damage. For instance, if one of the 
merchants issued instructions that influenced the order in which goods were jettisoned, 
this would be counterproductive, as in practice it would restrict the captain’s choices. The 
captain would be forced to jettison the goods in the prescribed order until the danger was 
averted. However, the total amount of cargo that was jettisoned would likely not be kept 
to a minimum, possibly leading to situations in which more goods were jettisoned than 
was strictly necessary. The captain’s discretion means that the safeguarding of the 
shipment can be maximized in the event of danger, and the collective damages mini-
mized. However, there is a condition necessary for this efficiency to occur: the captain’s 
discretion implies that the parties entrust him with authority on their behalf, and thus 
abandon their prerogative of control over their goods.
1.3.2. general averages and the ”partnering effect”
The merchants are not related to each other a priori. Dispatching goods on the same ship 
is not partnering. However, maritime law views the damages incurred as a result of the 
decisions of the captain as ‘general’ instead of personal. This means that the merchants 
become related in the event that the captain decides to jettison goods. This act brings 
them together in relation to the goods whose loss saved the ship. The rule of general 
averages introduces a form of partnership, but this partnership is generated by the captain’s 
strategic intervention. Although they did not choose to come together, they are partnered 
in the sense that they are jointly liable for the general averages.
Note that the partnering effect only covers damages resulting from the captain’s 
decisions. If the merchants and the captain had formed a company, they would pool the 
total proceeds of the sales made at the destination and, after deducting any losses and 
‘general averages,’ would share the profits in proportion to the initial shares of the goods 
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sold. The rule of general averages does not work in quite the same way. Only the damages 
caused by the captain’s decision to jettison are pooled, and are shared by the merchants in 
proportion to the final value of the goods, not the initial value of the goods embarked.
1.3.3. A Solidarity rule
Any damages are to be shared when they result from decisions that are made by the 
management (captain) for the collective interests. The rule is fair because, in practice, 
damages are shared between the merchants and because the losses are not borne by 
the merchants in proportion to the value of the goods on board at the port of embarkation, 
but in proportion to the value of the goods at destination, i.e. to the value of the goods which 
have been saved by the sacrifice. The lost value is not the value of the goods at the outset of 
the journey, but the value they would have had if they had reached their destination. Note 
that the rule of general averages does not apply to cases when goods are no longer fit for 
use or consumption on arrival at their destination. This is considered a ‘private’ rather than 
a general average, and there are no grounds for compensating the owner.
In addition, if the merchants had to share the losses in proportion to the initial value of 
the goods, this would rapidly give rise to unfair situations. Merchants whose goods have 
been saved and increased in value during the voyage would be favored, while a merchant 
whose cargo had no value on arrival (e.g. food no longer fit for consumption) could not 
compensate others. The rule is therefore preferable for each of the merchants, since the 
sharing of losses helps to limit their individual risk. In terms of probabilities, the expecta-
tions of gains are the same, but the shared risk is preferable in terms of risk aversion. The 
rule whereby losses are shared makes the sacrifice acceptable because of the under-
standing that it is a collective rather than an arbitrary sacrifice. Hence, it also makes the 
captain’s discretion acceptable.
To summarize, maritime law provides the captain with great discretion: this discretion 
must be used for common safety and for joint welfare. But maritime law does not provide 
the captain with excessive leeway. It defines an ex ante rule to ensure that strategic 
discretion is exercised in a fair way. The discretionary power of the captain is legitimate 
only to the extent that the effects of his/her decisions are shared.
2. An analogy with managerial discretion in business corporations
The captain’s situation is very different from that of a business manager, but the analogy is 
interesting, from a methodological point of view, in terms of thinking about the implica-
tions of discretion in relation to value allocation.
Scholars have acknowledged that analogies can effectively support theory building 
(Oswick, Keenoy, and Grant 2002; Tsoukas 1991). The key idea of analogies is to “compare 
what is being researched to something else; and in doing so, open up the topic to new 
perspectives.” (Swedberg 2012, 23). Building upon cognitive science, scholars have shown 
that analogies do not work as simple comparison. Instead they foster the generation and 
creation of new meaning beyond previously existing similarities:
“rather than selecting a particular profile of features or senses from a given set, the metaphoric 
conjunction of concepts (and their associated domains) creates new features and senses” 
(Cornelissen 2005, 757).
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In this approach, Ketokivi et al. (2017: p.640) suggest that the analogy is not merely 
a heuristic ‘scaffold’ to be discarded after it has served its purpose. Just the opposite, the 
analogy provides the very justification for the hypothesis by supplying an underlying 
structure for the explanation. An analogy opens up new ways of seeing a phenomenon 
proceeds with three steps (Cornelissen 2005):
-First, the structure of the source and the target to be seen as parallel are found and the 
correspondences between the two structures are mapped.
-Second, the elements from the target and source concepts are composed.
-And third, the emergent meaning is formulated, that invites to see the target subject 
in a new light.
And at the end, Ketokivi et al. (2017) propose a methodology to evaluate an analogy. 
An analogy must meet three criteria: 1) relevance (‘Does the analogy offer potential for 
insight? Is the analogy familiar enough to be understood by the audience?’), 2) structural 
soundness (‘Does the analogy lend itself to multiple related research questions?’), and 3) 
factual validity (‘Does the analogy lend itself to empirical research?’).
Following this framework, we want to use the analogy with the ship captain to open up 
new perspectives on the impacts of corporate leaders. The correspondences with the case 
of maritime law are important: first, managers in business corporations are expected to 
decide can be promoted the joint welfare of the corporation as a whole team. Second, 
managers are given legally and in practice important leeway to make decisions for the 
sake of the long-term success of the corporation. Third, these decisions can however 
impact the individual wealth and welfare of stakeholders. We will detail here the generic 
structure of this domain of managerial discretion to highlight the correspondences with 
the maritime case.
2.1 The need for equity: a central issue for stakeholder management
The term ‘stakeholder’ was popularized by Freeman (1984), but the impetus toward 
stakeholder theory emerged earlier. Freeman defined the stakeholder as ‘any group or 
individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement of the organization’s objectives’ 
(Freeman 1984: 46). It arose from the conviction that management’s role goes beyond 
a profit maximization function and that the responsibilities of managers are far broader in 
scope than merely maximizing shareholder value (Friedman 1970), extending to the 
interests and claims of non-stockholding groups (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 1997). 
Fundamentally, stakeholder theory views the firm as a ‘wealth-creating team’ (Kaufman 
and Englander 2005) and as a nexus of team-specific assets provided by shareholders, 
managers, employees, and others who hope to profit from team production (Gabrielsson, 
Huse, and Minichilli 2007).
Management scholars have characterized the various sources of stakeholders’ 
rights. Beyond the legal claims of the first stakeholders (‘internal or primary’ stake-
holders), some stakeholders have no contractual relationships, but nonetheless are 
critical to the firm’s operations (Clarkson 1995). They can claim some rights to the 
firm’s value (Asher, Mahoney, and Mahoney 2005) as they contribute to the wealth- 
creation process, either through specific investments (Hill and Jones 1992) or because 
the value of their assets is affected by the fate of the enterprise (Kochan and 
Rubinstein 2000).
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Although there have been numerous debates on whether and how these rights should 
be recognized contractually and enforced normatively, scholars have mainly considered 
that it was the duty of management to run the business for the best interest of the 
corporation. According to the Team Production Theory (Blair and Stout 1999), this is 
precisely why the corporation was designed in law as a special entity. A firm is created 
when a series of individual efforts are combined, with a cooperative spirit for a joint 
output. Specific investments (meaning that they are difficult to recover once committed 
to the project) must be made by the different gains are inseparable (meaning that it is 
difficult to attribute any particular portion of the gains to any particular stakeholder). 
Under these conditions, it is difficult to draft explicit contracts regarding value allocation 
because it is difficult to decide on the allocation of profits beforehand, as it would reduce 
incentive, but if the rules for sharing are not decided in advance, there is the risk of very 
expensive ex post bargaining.
To agree on a procedure that all consider fair, what do team members do? ‘They form 
a public corporation’ they voluntarily transfer ‘authority over the division of production 
rents and surpluses to an independent body – a mediating hierarchy in the form of the 
board of directors – that will monitor their efforts and determine how each can best be 
rewarded for past contributions, as well as be incentivized for future contributions, in the 
process also guarding against mutual opportunism among the parties’ (Lan and 
Heracleous 2010, 300).
In law, this is consistent with the fiduciary duties directors and executive officers have: 
they are entrusted with the power to act on behalf and for the benefit not of one 
particular stakeholder, but for the benefit of the corporation itself. In the UK for instance, 
the Company Act 2006 says: ‘A director of a company must act in the way he considers, in 
good faith, would be most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its 
members as a whole’. It means that directors and managers can be made accountable to 
the company if it can be shown that their decisions resulted in a loss for the company. In 
these conditions, managerial discretion is a key condition for stakeholder management 
and fair value allocation.
2.2 Managerial discretion: a key condition for stakeholder management
In Team Production Theory, the board is conceived as a third party capable of arbitration 
between the stakeholders to solve potential conflicts of interest (Hillman and Dalziel 2003; 
Lan and Heracleous 2010). Its role is to encourage firm-specific investments by making 
sure that value is allocated in a fair way. To give it the necessary leeway to do that, 
corporate law aims at protecting directors’ discretion in a number of ways. For instance, 
the business judgment rule grants that directors’ decisions cannot be challenged by 
stakeholders in normal situations, i.e. if they were made in good faith, on an informed 
basis, and ‘in the honest belief that the action taken was in the best interest of the 
company’ (Blair and Stout 1999, 787).
‘Managerial discretion can be defined as the latitude of managerial action available to 
a decision-maker’ (Wangrow, Schepker, and Barker 2015), 100), be it latitude in terms of 
objectives or in terms of actions (Shen and Cho 2005). Although stakeholder theory is not 
framed explicitly in terms of managerial discretion, its central premise is that managers 
have the leeway to pay attention to different constituencies and to promote the general 
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welfare. For instance, stewardship is facilitated when a CEO chairs the board of directors 
because he/she is then given greater authority and discretionary powers (Donaldson and 
Davis 1991, Charreaux and Desbrières, 2001).
The literature on managerial discretion has addressed both the antecedents for and 
the effects of managerial discretion (Hambrick and Finkesltein 1987; Hambrick and 
Abrahamson 1995). Regarding its antecedents, managerial discretion appears to be 
constrained not only by the task environment, internal organization, managerial charac-
teristics, and activities (Finkelstein and Peteraf 2007), but also by the broader environ-
ment. Industry regulation and state legislation play a noticeable role in managerial 
discretion (Crossland and Hambrick 2007, 2011). The impacts of managerial discretion 
have also been studied, especially in relation to executive compensation and firm perfor-
mance (Wangrow, Schepker, and Barker 2015). However, the dynamics of managerial 
discretion are rarely analyzed (Phillips et al. 2010).
2.3 The impact of managers’ discretion upon stakeholders
Managerial discretion refers to the options available to managers to manage the business in 
the best interests of the corporation (for the common good). It does not imply the transfer 
of property rights but, rather, control rights: the parties, while maintaining ownership of 
their assets, transfer their control rights so that management can use them for a collective 
strategy. For instance, shareholders own their share but entrust business leaders with the 
management of their capital. Similarly, workers own their competencies but their employ-
ment contract makes them subordinate. They are required to follow managerial prescrip-
tions even when the strategy may impact them either positively (e.g. increase in human 
capital through learning processes) or negatively (e.g. limited employability).
How does corporate law deal with the heterogeneous impacts of managerial deci-
sions upon stakeholders? A priori, corporate law does not prescribe either the way 
benefits are allocated or the way losses are distributed. We usually see the corporate 
setting as a solidarity system as stockholders share benefits and losses. But in practice, 
even among shareholders, there is no complete solidarity rule. The value of the 
company’s shares can vary significantly as a result of managerial decisions, but if one 
shareholder realizes a significant gain by selling his/her shares, he/she does not share 
his/her gain with the other shareholders (who do not sell), or with the other stake-
holders. There are some important ex ante rules however. Some of them, like economic 
lay-offs and bankruptcy law, concern precisely decisions for the collective interest of the 
corporation.
In the case of economic lay-offs, labor law proposes a justice principle: severance 
packages are planned in employment contracts to compensate wage-earners in case of 
lay-offs. However, if the economic lay-offs are successful, i.e. if they allow the business to 
prosper, then the future benefits of the company are not considered in the calculation of 
the compensations. Similarly, in a case of bankruptcy, the law sets some priority rules: 
secured investors are given clear priorities over the assets compared to unsecured ones 
(Jackson and Scott 1989). Bankruptcy law however looks more like a general averages 
system when debt restructuration is decided for the sake of the business survival. This 
analogy has already been outlined by some authors (Jackson and Scott 1989; Iwicki 1990), 
but it is limited. In particular, the law allows debt restructuring for the collective interest 
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even if it causes important losses for some stakeholders. But the law does not explicitly 
determine those losses should be balanced or shared among them.
Apart from these cases of decisions taken to ‘save’ the company, we can note that 
some legislation requires companies to negotiate agreements in relation to profit sharing. 
In France, when profits allow for an increase in equity, big companies must allocate 
a portion of the newly created shares to their employees who have made this increase 
in equity possible (Baghdadi, Bellakhal, and Diaye 2016). However, these are exceptions. 
There are few rules about how to deal with the possibility of unbalanced distributional 
outcomes among the parties. And this may be all the more problematic when managers 
can be influenced to promote the interests of some stakeholder, at the expense of others.
In practice, shareholders are given great power to influence directors, as directors are 
appointed exclusively by the shareholders (Greenwood 2005; Greenfield 2008; Mayer 
2013). Directors are legally accountable to the firm’s shareholders (Kaufman and 
Englander 2005), and thus corporate law does not really ‘insulate’ the board from share-
holder pressure (Millon 2000). More generally, some stakeholders, even if they do not 
have explicit legal rights, can influence the firm’s behavior (Mitchell, Agle, and Wood 
1997). Previous studies have described how the value that is created can be appropriated 
by stakeholders in accordance with their respective bargaining power (Coff 1999; Garcia- 
Castro and Aguilera 2015).
Given the risks of unbalanced impacts of managerial decisions, different options have 
been considered in addressing inequality. The first consists of reinforcing managerial 
discretion against external pressure. Various corporate laws have been amended, such as 
the constituency statutes that strengthen managers’ leeway and allow them to pay 
attention to interests other than those of the shareholders (Bainbridge 2004). New legal 
forms of corporations, such as benefit corporations in the US or ‘société à mission’ in 
France, have also been introduced in a number of states to provide a ‘safe harbor’ to allow 
managers of companies to pursue social or environmental objectives (Bromberger 2011; 
Cormac, Susan, and Haney 2012a, 2012a; Segrestin, Hatchuel, and Levillain 2020). The 
alternative is to make managers accountable to various stakeholders (Wells 2002) by 
extending measures of performance beyond mere shareholder value, broadening fidu-
ciary duties, or broadening the control rights of various parties by allowing them to sit on 
the board (Asher, Mahoney, and Mahoney 2005).
These proposals have been implemented locally, but have given rise to a number of 
criticisms. For instance, it has been argued that managers can hardly be asked to pursue all 
stakeholders’ interests, as this could lead to significant control issues (Boatright 1994; Jensen 
2001). The need to attend to multiple stakeholders would likely diminish managers’ account-
ability. Any attempt to challenge directors would become illusory, as any decision could be 
justified in terms of its potential impact on at least one stakeholder (Sternberg 2009).
While managerial discretion has been seen as a fundamental condition for fair value 
allocation, it is necessary to re-examine how corporate law should handle the impacts of 
managerial discretion in a fair way.
3. Discussion: the partnering effect in a corporate setting
Maritime law helps us to explore the effects of a ship captain’s discretion, as ship captains 
historically enjoy exceptional powers when at sea (Tarrade 1999). More specifically, 
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maritime law makes visible a class of decisions that are at the same time critical from an 
efficiency point of view and problematic in terms of fairness. These decisions are the 
expenditures or sacrifices managers can be required to make for the commonwealth. This 
kind of decision has a more general relevance in companies, where managers not only 
make decisions to ‘sacrifice’ assets (for instance, through layoffs or restructuring plans), 
but can also proceed with beneficial actions (for instance, investing in research that 
develops employees’ competencies or making decisions that increase shareholder 
value). Finally, maritime law has adopted rules that differ fundamentally from those of 
corporate law regarding value allocation. In the case of companies, there is no norm on 
how the impacts of managerial decisions on different parties are shared collectively. 
Corporate law leaves the question of allocation up to the board of directors. On the 
contrary, maritime law defines ex ante rules.
The rule of general averages thus provides important insights into the way in which 
value is allocated in companies and helps us to analyze the relationship between manage-
rial discretion and fair value allocation. To discuss the ‘structural soundness’ of the 
analogy, we develop its theoretical and normative implications for companies along 
three lines. First, the analogy enriches our view of managerial discretion and makes visible 
the ‘general’ impacts of managerial decisions upon stakeholders. Second, we argue that 
managerial discretion has a ‘partnering effect’, which leads to discriminate, among the 
stakeholders, those who are effectively partnered. Third, the analogy challenges both the 
team production theory of the corporation and corporate law by calling for a solidarity 
rule.
3.1 Qualifying impact of managerial decisions as general averages
The rule of general averages first invites to see in a new light the impact of managerial 
decisions upon stakeholders.
Managers, by their hierarchical function and by contract, are entitled to make decisions 
that may impact the potential (assets or capabilities) of some stakeholders. For instance, 
managers’ decisions can strengthen the human capital of some employees but it can also 
lead sometimes to a decrease in the employability of employees. They can also increase or 
decrease the value of the company’s shares. As the consequences of their decisions are 
uncertain, managerial authority is a source of risk, at least for those who submit to their 
authority.
This source of risk is usually underestimated. It is generally acknowledged that stake-
holders can make risky firm-specific investments. For instance, employees might invest in 
specialized learning processes whose outcomes only have value in their particular team 
(Rajan and Zingales 1998). In this view, investment decisions are made by individuals and 
the risks they take derive directly from their investment decisions or from the opportu-
nism of the other team members. However, this view overlooks the fact that the invest-
ments of the stakeholders are often not decided by the parties themselves: risks can result 
from the decisions made by the managers instead of stakeholders themselves.
Our analogy thus suggests that these impacts, either positive or negative, could be 
considered as ‘general averages’ since there are made for the benefit of the joint welfare. 
This is very different from the classical view in business corporation, where neither the 
negative nor positive impacts of management decisions are usually seen as ‘general’ 
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averages. On the contrary, stakeholders generally appropriate the various assets that are 
(collectively) accumulated by a firm in accordance with their respective bargaining power 
(Coff 1999).
Should we consider that the approach from maritime law should apply to all impacts of 
managerial decisions? This would be excessive, especially because the rule for general 
average is conceived only for exceptional situations of emergency. In practice however, it 
is important to note that the scope of the rule has been expanded far beyond imminent 
peril (Tetley 2003, 23): the peril does not need to be imminent, nor is the peril necessary to 
apply the rule of general averages: “If ‘peril’ was an essential ingredient of general 
average, it was reduced in importance in 1890 and 1950 by new dispositions. Peril did 
not have to be ‘immediate’, provided that it was ‘real and not imaginary’. A potential 
danger is enough. Since 1994, ‘claims may be made for general average expenses at the port 
of discharge, even when there is no peril.’ In the spirit of this observation, it is perhaps 
legitimate to consider a range of impacts of managerial decisions on stakeholders as 
general averages.
And more generally, the role of our analogy is not to make only strict correspondences 
between our source and target domains. Its role is instead to challenge our way of 
conceptualizing equity in business decisions. And here, the rule of general averages 
makes us realize that some stakeholders can be affected by decisions taken for collective 
purposes, without being considered as general averages. It thus questions whether these 
impacts are treated in a fair way.
3.2 The ‘partnering effect’ and a new delimitation of team members
If we consider that positive and negative consequences of managerial decisions could be 
considered as ‘general’ rather than ‘personal,’ then they should be viewed as collective, 
and shared among the team members. Under these conditions, the partnering effect 
could also apply in the case of companies. But while the merchants are concerned by 
sacrifice in maritime law, who are the corporate stakeholders actually concerned by this 
collective interest?
Here we need to explore further the consequences of the rule to characterize among 
the stakeholders, who is effectively partnered. Conceptually, the partnering effect char-
acterizes the interdependencies generated by the strategic discretion among the stake-
holders that submit to hierarchy of managers. While all stakeholders can be impacted by 
management decisions, not all stakeholders transfer their control rights over their capital 
to management. Not all of them submit to hierarchy or consent to managerial discretion. 
We need to distinguish the parties which entitle managers to make decisions on their 
behalf, from those which keep their control rights and can sue management if they are 
negatively affected by a management decision.
The partnering effect leads us to suggest that managerial discretion introduces differ-
entiation among stakeholders. Stakeholder theorists have a broader view that includes all 
parties affected by management. Many typologies seek to account for managerial prio-
rities (or to prioritize parties). For instance, internal/external or primary/secondary stake-
holders are often distinguished. Kochan and Rubinstein (2000) come closer to the notion 
of team production by focusing on the stakeholders ‘who put something at risk’ and 
speaking about ‘genuine stakeholders.’ Other authors suggest different categories, such 
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as stakewatchers and stakekeepers, and further outline the reciprocal obligations that 
some stakeholders can have toward the firm (Fassin 2012).
When Blair and Stout (1999) talk of a ‘production team,’ they are referring to those 
who contribute, by their specific investment, to the production process. However, to the 
best of our knowledge, no distinction has been suggested that differentiates stake-
holders based on their level of commitment to managerial authority. A distinction must 
then be made between those stakeholders who transfer their control rights to manage-
ment and others. In other words, parties who formally accept managerial authority and 
allow managerial discretion, i.e. give their consent (Phillips 1997), entrust managers, and 
accept that their resources and capabilities are used in the common interest, are 
partnered. The other stakeholders can still be affected by the collective action but 
they continue to manage their resources on their own: they are not concerned by the 
partnering effect.
This analysis invites to reconsider the perimeter of the team:
-Typically, workers and stockholders will a priori be the most partnered stakeholders. 
Workers, as subordinates, permit management to define the actions that must be per-
formed in doing their jobs. They are clearly subject to managerial discretion. Stockholders 
formally permit the board to make decisions to develop their capital on their behalf, 
although here, the legal status is less clear, and we can question whether all shareholders 
are partnered. Do those shareholders who remain anonymous and whose shareholding is 
only for a very short period really grant the board strategic discretion?
-Similarly, we could consider some suppliers, subcontractors or service providers, even 
though they are a priori external to the company, as partnered parties if they agree to 
follow the company’s strategic orientations.
3.3 The need for a solidarity rule
Corporate law does not stipulate any general ex ante rule regarding the individual impact 
of managerial decisions. There are some cases of ex ante rules, as we have mentioned, for 
instance for economic lay-off or bankruptcy. But can we consider these rules as fair in the 
light of the maritime law?
For instance, some employees can be laid off for economic reasons, that is, their 
sacrifice is considered necessary for the firm to survive. By law, they receive severance 
pay, but neither the loss they bear through being laid off nor the future profits of the 
company are shared. Take the case of an engineer who contributes to the design of a new 
plant. If he is laid off for economic reasons, and if the plant becomes afterward very 
profitable, the engineer will be compensated for the lost job, but not for the future value 
his job could have had.
Here, the rule of general averages provides a compelling reason for challenging the 
fairness of corporate law. Blair and Stout (1999) assume that corporate law was designed 
to give directors the leeway to allocate the results in a fair way. The board, as a ‘mediating 
hierarch,’ has the duty of promoting the interest of the corporation and of protecting it 
from various private demands and interests. Yet, as noted earlier, the neutrality of the 
board is somewhat hypothetical, and rarely verified, as only the shareholders can appoint 
directors. Theoretically, our analysis shows that team production theory does not con-
ceptualize the impacts of managerial discretion: Corporate law allows for managerial 
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discretion without requiring any solidarity between those who are affected by the related 
‘general impacts’ of managerial decisions.
Under these conditions, we argue that managerial discretion has a ‘partnering effect’ 
and that it normally binds together those stakeholders who actually recognize and accept 
managerial strategic discretion. Thus, our analogy calls for a solidarity rule to share the 
impacts of managerial decisions on ‘partnered stakeholders.’ In practice, this rule would 
require ex ante that any strategy designed by corporate leaders must achieve a balance 
between employees and shareholders. Management should also be required to report on 
how they integrate fairness into their strategic thinking. Ex post, corporate officers should 
also be asked to account for the general impacts of their decisions and to organize some 
form of redistribution when these impacts are not balanced. Some form of redistributive 
mechanism could be set up.
For instance, when employees are made redundant for economic reasons, their layoffs 
are meant to enable the firm to survive. The solidarity principle suggests that they should 
benefit at a later date from the profits that are made possible by their sacrifice. In practice, 
this could be achieved by a distribution of free shares to enable them to share in future 
dividends. However, one could also imagine the creation of a ‘solidarity fund.’ All part-
nered stakeholders could contribute to this fund when their assets increased. For exam-
ple, shareholders could be required to contribute a percentage to the fund when they 
sold their shares if the performance of the firm had increased the value of their shares. 
This fund could then be used to compensate the partnered parties when they suffered 
‘general damages.’ Such mechanisms need to be further examined and tested. Our 
intention is not to formulate detailed mechanisms, but to suggest a general duty of 
fairness on the part of corporate leaders and to suggest that such a duty should be 
mandated by law.
4. Conclusion
Stakeholder theory suggests that multiple groups have a stake in the activities of the firm 
and merit consideration in managerial decision-making. It emphasizes the importance of 
non-stockholder groups to the success of companies. However, not all stakeholders who 
have legitimate claims receive the consideration they merit. To date, the freedom that 
managers have to allocate value among stakeholders has remained relatively unchal-
lenged. However, given the inequalities that can be generated by corporate behavior, as 
scholars, we need to question this freedom and its foundations.
In this paper, we have built upon a historical case to discuss how stakeholder theory 
and corporate law connect value allocation and managerial discretion. Our aim in using 
this analogy was to introduce a new way of considering the impacts of managerial 
discretion. When stakeholders allow managerial discretion by recognizing managerial 
authority, they are made interdependent by a ‘partnering effect’ of managerial discretion. 
Should they not, therefore, jointly support the impacts of managerial decisions made for 
collective purposes?
Obviously, managerial authority differs from a ship captain’s authority, and its legal 
framework is, of course, highly specific (including rules such as the business judgment 
rule). The analogy does not build a case for transposing the rule of general averages from 
maritime law to the corporate setting. Rather, it offers creative theoretical insights 
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through its contribution to the theorization of the partnering effect of managerial discre-
tion. It also makes visible the implications of managerial discretion that to date have been 
ignored by both stakeholder theory and corporate law, and it helps us to discuss multiple 
related research questions such as managerial discretion, stakeholder theory, and solidar-
ity in corporate law. Thus, it provides new insights into how we should conceptualize 
managerial discretion, and how to differentiate among the stakeholders partnered by 
strategic managerial discretion and the possible normative implications of this effect.
Our study clearly calls for further research, especially empirical research (the third 
criterion of factual validity, according to Ketokivi et al., (2017)). The rule of general 
averages suggests a research agenda aimed at identifying the general impacts of man-
agerial decisions that need to be considered and shared. Beyond financial profits, a variety 
of assets (e.g. cognitive, financial, and relational) would need to be taken into considera-
tion. Here, both evaluation methods and management techniques need to be elaborated, 
as do the criteria for assessing what is meant by fair (Barney 2020). For instance, the 
rewards do not need to be allocated equally among stakeholders. They can vary accord-
ing to the level, length, and importance of the investments made by the various con-
stituencies. New ways to design balanced strategies, to define fairness, and to organize 
solidarity also need to be explored.
More generally, our study opens up new avenues for research at the crossroads 
between management and law. By modeling the partnering effect of strategic discretion, 
our study questions how corporate law conceptualizes management and managerial 
discretion. The role of law is not to impose new duties or restrictions on the latitude of 
managers, but it has to build upon a comprehensive view of management to make sure 
managerial discretion can be exercised in an efficient and legitimate way. It is therefore 
possible that research in management can help in reframing corporate law. While man-
agement scholars have sought to rethink management theory with a ‘view from law’ (Lan 
and Heracleous, 2010), they could also question corporate law with a view from manage-
ment and management history.
Note
1. Justinian’s Digest of Roman Law: one section relates to general average. The first paragraphs 
says: ‘The Rhodian Law decrees that, if goods are thrown overboard to lighten a ship, all shall 
make good by contribution that which has been given for all.’ Quoted by (Jervis 2013).
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